

IAEA Strategies to Strengthen the Effectiveness and Improve the Efficiency of IAEA Safeguards

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
IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

State-Level Concept

The general notion of implementing safeguards in a manner that considers a State's nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope of the State's safeguards agreement

Key Developments in Safeguards Implementation for the 'State as a whole'



State-Specific Factors

- Safeguards-relevant factors particular to a State used in the development of an State-level approach and in the planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities for that State
- Based on factual information about a State, are objective and are objectively assessed by the Agency in the implementation of safeguards for a State

State-Specific Factors

- i. The type of safeguards agreement in force for the State and the nature of the safeguards conclusion drawn by the Agency
- ii. The nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities of the State
- iii. The technical capabilities of the State or regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC)
- iv. The ability of the Agency to implement certain safeguards measures in the State
- v. The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the Agency in the implementation of safeguards
- vi. The Agency's experience in implementing safeguards in the State

SLC Overview and Key Points

- SLC is **applicable to all States**, within the scope of the State's safeguards agreement
- Elements of the SLC have been applied for several years to varying degrees for all States, but **customized State-level approaches (SLAs)** have **so far** only been implemented for **the 53 States** under integrated safeguards
- The Secretariat envisages the **updating of the existing SLAs** and the **progressive development of SLAs** for other States in the future
- In developing and implementing an SLA, the **Agency will conduct consultations with the State and/or regional authority**, especially on implementation of in-field measures

SLC Overview and Key Points (2)

- Generic safeguards objectives are established on the basis of the State's SG agreement to implement effective SG and are common to all States with the same type of SG agreement
- The technical objectives (TOs) contained in a State's SLA will remain within the scope of the State's SG agreement
- The acquisition/diversion path analyses used to establish TOs are structured, technical methods and do not involve judgments about States' intentions to pursue any such path
- SLA implementation will focus on attaining the TOs instead of mechanistically carrying out SG activities listed in the Safeguards Criteria

SLC Key Assurances

- The implementation of SG in the context of the SLC will **not entail any additional rights or obligations**, nor modification in their interpretation
- SLAs will **not introduce any new safeguards measures** beyond those set out in a State's SG agreement, and **adjustments** in their implementation will be made **within the flexibility provided in the SG agreement and subsidiary arrangements**
- It is essential that **effectiveness** of safeguards **be maintained** – **nuclear material accountancy** and its verification in the field **will remain at the core**, and verification effort will continue to **focus on sensitive stages** of the nuclear fuel cycle

SLC Key Assurance (2)

- There will be more systematic consideration and better use of **the six objective State-specific factors**, which are based on technical considerations and will be used objectively
- SG implementation in the context of the SLC will **not introduce any changes to the type of information being used**, and **States will not be required to provide any additional information** beyond their existing legal obligations
- The Agency will continue to conduct **rigorous review and validation of all safeguards relevant information**

Strengthening Cooperation and Partnerships

Strategies

- Work to ensure that all States have competent State SG authorities and support States in making their SSACs/RSACs more effective
- Make greater use of technically capable SSACs/RSACs, realizing efficiencies in safeguards implementation where possible



- Engage States to increase the voluntary sharing of safeguards relevant information
- Increase cooperation and improve coordination with Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs)

Strengthening Cooperation and Partnerships

Strategies

- Develop and promote the concept of 'safeguardability' to facilitate effective and efficient future safeguards implementation



- Participate in international efforts (e.g. INPRO) to increase nuclear facilities' resistance to proliferation

- Share implementation experiences and good practices with other organizations and entities combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as appropriate

Thank You

